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Article 3

The Demise of Civil Nuisance
Actions in Obscenity Control
Rosalee C. Gorman*
INTRODUCTION

Few areas of the law have presented courts with such vexatious
issues as those involved in the regulation of obscenity. Initial judicial attempts to define obscenity have yielded conflicting and confusing results' with standards often impossible to manage in
practice. 2 In addition, the enforcement of such standards has
3
proven less than adequate.
Part of the difficulty of any regulation in this area is its traditional tendency to evoke emotional responses. 4 Debate on the
advisability of setting limits on sexual expression has raged since
the turn of the century. 5 Not surprisingly, the courts may at times

*B.S. 1967, Bowling Green State University; J.D. 1974, Cleveland State University.
1. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
"One cannot say with certainty that material is obscene until at least five members of this
Court, applying inevitably obscure standards, have pronounced it so." Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,92 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
3. "For a variety of reasons-chiefly, perhaps, their lack of success in court, due to broad
and ambiguous state statutes-district attorneys across the country are unenthusiastic
about pornography litigation." Michelson, The Aesthetics of Pornography,reprintedin THE
FIRST AMENDMENT IN A FREE SOCIETY 11 (J. Bartlett ed. 1979), originally printed in 226 The
Nation 105-08 (Feb. 4, 1978).
4.

T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 467 (1970). Professor Emerson

states that obscenity appears to be an aberration in the rules governing first amendment
analysis. 'This state of affairs is probably due in large part to the intense and emotional
pressures on the courts from the conventional wisdom which views obscenity, at least when
available to others, as highly corrupting of the mind and spirit. Hence, although obscenity
usually appears in the form of expression, the courts dare not treat it in the same way as
other kinds of expression." Id.
5. This debate has been characterized as evidence of society's reaction to impending
changes.
During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Americans whose values were
rooted in a pre-urban, preindustrial nation sought to preserve their culture against
the ominous currents of social change that swept across the countryside. These
defenders of rural Protestant values in an increasingly heterogeneous urban
society battled for purity on many fronts. Purity in print, in Paul S. Boyer's
felicitous phrase, was especially critical at a time when new techniques of mass
communication portended mass literacy on an unprecedented scale. American
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be unclear as to what and whose interests the law should protect.6 The judiciary is pressured by some segments of society to
regulate obscenity, yet is faced with a lack of substantial evidence
as to its harmful effects. 7 This problem is further compounded by
the strictures of the first amendment, designed to protect all forms
of expression.8
Despite their defects, laws regulating the suppression of sexual
material still comprise part of both the civil and criminal codes.
Prosecutors charged with administering this legislation must
grapple not only with obscure legal standards but also with a
radical change, over the past few years, in both the content and the
distribution of questionable material. While earlier obscenity litigation often concerned works of literary stature, the "adult" bookstores and theaters flourishing today offer less "respectable" fare.9
This point is graphically illustrated by a comparison of D.H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover 10 and Henry Miller's Tropic of
Cancer"l with the current flood of explicit periodicals and "peep

custodians of Victorian culture joined hands in the vice-society movement, 'a
response to deep-seated fears about the drift of urban life in the post-Civil War
years'. In an era which was 'perhaps the last in which adults had a fair chance to
impose their judgments on young people,' censorship of obscene literature became
for many Americans a compelling social obligation. (footnotes omitted).
Auerbach, Introductionto T. SCHROEDER, "OBSCENE" LJTERATURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
at vii (2d ed. 1972).
6. T. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 467.
7. Comment, The Devil and the D.A.: The Civil Abatement of Obscenity, 28 HASTINGS
L.J. 1329, 1352 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment, The Devil and the D.A.] (citing UNITED
STATES COMM'N ON OBSCENITY AND PORNOGRAPHY, REPORT OF THE COMM'N ON OBSCENITY AND
PORNOGRAPHY (1970)).

8. But see Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), where Justice
Stevens writing for the majority indicates that sexually explicit expression, while protected
from total suppression, does not enjoy the same first amendment scrutiny as political
speech: "[Flew of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizens'
right to see 'specified sexual activities' exhibited in the theaters of our choice." Id. at 70.
9. Tolerance of more explicit material may be a result of increased freedom of expression.
Today, in the United States, there appears to be a greater measure of freedom for
literary, artistic, and cinematic sexual expression than ever before in the American past. The evidence lies in the books and magazines we can obtain from our
city newsstands, the films we can see at our neighborhood movie houses, and the
plays we can attend at our 'off and 'off-off Broadway and university theaters.
De Grazia, Introduction to CENSORSHIP LANDMARKS at xix (E. De Grazia ed. 1969).
10. See Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N. Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959),
where the Court reversed the state's denial of a license regarding the film version of LADY
CHATTERLEY'S LOVER.

11. See Besig v. United States, 208 F.2d 142 (9th Cir. 1953), where the Court described
Miller's work as follows:
The author conducts the reader through sex orgies and perversions of the sex
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shows," where a quarter will purchase a minute and a half of
sexual movie action. The society which was shocked by the language of Norman Mailer's The Naked and the Dead in 194812 is
now confronted with a plethora of explicit, readily available sexual
13
material.
Distributors of sexual material have also changed. Celebrated
obscenity cases of the 1950's and early 1960's generally involved
legitimate publishers or avant-garde film distributors with principles to defend.1 4 In contrast, the current marketing of sexually
explicit expresson is a big business enterprise where potentially
enormous profits may accrue from continually supplying the public with undistinguished material. 15 Furthermore, recent studies
speculate that organized crime interests have infiltrated the por16
nography business.
These developments in the character and marketing of sexual
materials have frustrated enforcement of the obscenity laws. 17 In
general, government enforcement agencies have found legal definitions vague, and suppression procedures ponderous and expensive. Criminal investigations have taken years with prosecutions
often resulting in hung juries,18 reversals on appeal, 19 or acquitorgans, and always in the debased language of the bawdy house. Nothing has the
grace of purity or goodness. These words of the language of smut, and the disgraceful scenes, are so heavily larded throughout the books that those portions
which are deemed to be of literary merit do not lift the reader's mind clear of their
sticky slime.
Id. at 145.
12. See C. REMBAR THE END OF OBSCENITY 17 n.1 (1968).
13. Professor Emerson, referring to this distinction in types of material, stated: "[Tihe
impact of obscenity laws falls primarily, or would if the laws could be enforced, upon
particular groups in our society who happen not to prefer or be able to afford elite pornography." T. EMERSON, supra note 4, at 500.
14. See generally De Grazia, supra note 9.
15. PORNOGRAPHY, OBSCENITY AND THE LAW 31-33 (L. Sobel ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as
PORNOGRAPHY].

16. Media and government sources have speculated that the dissemination of obscenity
has been, in large measure, taken over by organized crime interests. A relatively recent
study has concluded that in the late 1960's the field of pornography became a logical
candidate for entry by organized crime and that the business is now a part of its entrepreneurial network. Id. at 29-34 (citing TASK FORCE ON ORGANIZED CRIME, CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STANDARDS AND GOALS (National Advisory Comm. 1976)).
17. Rendleman, Civilizing Pornography:The Casefor an Exclusive Obscenity Nuisance
Statute, 44 U. CHI.L. REv. 509, 521 (1977).
18. See Universal Amusement Co., Inc. v. Vance, 404 F. Supp. 33, 37 (S.D. Tex. 1975);
Note, Porno Non Est Pro Bono Publico: Obscenity as a Public Nuisance in California,4
HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 385, 402 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Obscenity as a Public
Nuisance].
19. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,83-84 (1973). Because the standards
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tals stemming from jury frustration with incomprehensible definitions. 20 Especially troublesome from the government's perspective
is the possible financing of criminal defense litigation by profitable business enterprises or even organized crime. The balance of
available resources rests clearly with the purveyors in a criminal
action, where a trial might result in the conviction of one offender
after years of protracted litigation, during which time his business
remains open and flourishing.
Because of these problems authorities have looked to civil litigation as a possibly more effective enforcement tool. On first view, a
civil trial appears more attractive than a criminal prosecution
laden with constitutional safeguards. 21 The trial itself is less complicated and the remedies available are broader than a single criminal conviction. A variety of legal theories, such as public nuisance
law, 22 general business licensing, 23 administrative censorship
25
boards enforced by judicial sanctions, 2 4 and zoning authority,
give the government a wider choice of remedial options.
This article examines the use of civil actions to control obscenity,
particularly those based on state public nuisance laws. It reviews
the background of civil obscenity regulation and the constitutional
problems, both substantive and procedural, stemming from the use
of nuisance laws as discussed in federal and state court opinions.
The conclusions drawn indicate that heavy procedural burdens
imposed by first amendment considerations have rendered such
civil actions expensive and unproductive. Although civil nuisance
proceedings have been judicially sanctioned, their remedial aspects have been severely weakened and their future utility is in
doubt.

surrounding obscenity are so difficult to administer, errors by the trial court will be more
frequent. Id. at 83.
20. United States v. Sovereign News Co., No. 76-124, slip. op. (N.D. Ohio 1978).
21. In contrast to a criminal action, a civil approach has the following advantages: 1) an
injunction against specific material has an immediate effect; 2) a prosecutor is more likely to
prevail on a lower standard of proof; and 3) as a back up a prosecutor can request a
contempt citation or institute a criminal action. Comment, The Devil and the D.A., supra
note 7, at 1331. See J. BARRON & C. DIENES, HANDBOOK OF FREE SPEECH AND FREE PRESS 676
(1979); Houge, RegulatingObscenity Through the Power to Define and Abate Nuisances, 14
WAKE FOREST L. REv 1, 15 (1978).
22. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.01 (Page 1980).
23. See Chulchian v. Indianapolis, 633 F.2d 27 (7th Cir. 1980); Cornflower Entertainment, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 485 F. Supp. 777 (D. Utah 1980).
24. See Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
25. See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
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CIVIL REGULATORY APPROACH

Background
States have utilized a variety of civil proceedings to regulate
obscenity. Censorship review boards meeting procedural standards were constitutionally approved, but have fallen into disuse in
recent years. 26 State laws regulating general business licensing
have been invoked to deny permits to pornography distributors,
although courts have restricted such denials on first amendment
grounds. 27 In addition, zoning restrictions have operated, with
Supreme Court approval, as a valid exercise of police power to curb
obscenity. 28 Finally, the state's power to abate nuisances within
its jurisdiction has 'been implemented through general common
nuisance statutes 29 and particular legislation aimed at obscenity. 30
The Supreme Court has approved the state adoption of obscenity
regulation as an alternative to criminal prosecution where restraint occurs only after trial on the issue of obscenity. 31 In this
context, the Court has reaffirmed its endorsement of state civil
proceedings which serve to notify a distributor regarding the obscenity of his material before criminal charges are filed. 32 On the

strength of this approval, prosecutors have instituted civil actions
under state or local nuisance statutes against distributors of
explicit materials. Use of such laws, however, has caused critics to
challenge their constitutionality on both procedural and substan-

26. These types of censorship boards have generally fallen into disuse. One of the last
remaining, the Maryland Board of Censors, ceased operation in June, 1981, when the state
cut off its funding.
27. General business licensing laws have been implemented but a grant of a license
cannot be constitutionally conditioned on the content of the material exhibited. Courts have
held that a license revocation or denial cannot be based upon prior violations of obscenity
laws. See cases cited supra note 23.
28. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976). But see Schad v. Borough
of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981), where the Court refused to uphold a zoning restriction
totally prohibiting live entertainment within city limits.
29. See, e.g., Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 17 Cal. 3d 42,550 P.2d 600,130 Cal. Rptr.
328, cert. denied sub nom. Van de Kamp v. Projection Room Theater, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
30. See State ex rel. Ewing v. "Without a Stitch," 37 Ohio St. 2d 95,307 N.E. 2d 911 (1974),
appeal dismissed sub nom. Art Theater Guild, Inc. v. Ewing, 421 U.S. 923 (1975).
31. Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 437 (1957). The Court stressed that the
acceptability of this procedure turned on the fact that "it studiously withholds restraint
upon material not already published and not yet found to be offensive." Id. at 445. See also
Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961), where the Court rejected the
defendants' assertion of a right to exhibit material at least once.
32. See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
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tive grounds. 33 As discussed below, the major flaw of nuisance
statutes is their tendency to operate as unconstitutional prior restraints, and it is this defect which has most hampered their application in obscenity control.
UTILIZATION OF STATE NUISANCE STATUTES

CriminalSafeguards Not Present in Nuisance Actions
Although civil actions to enjoin obscenity nuisances resemble
criminal prosecutions in several respects, 34 there are at least two
aspects of criminal trials which do not pertain to nuisance cases,
the right to a jury and the criminal burden of proof. The elimination of these features would simplify and shorten any trial and
thus make a civil action more attractive to a prosecutor.
Judges and commentators have speculated whether a jury need
determine the issue of obscenity 35 in light of the Supreme Court's
insistence that obscenity be judged by the trier of fact applying
contemporary community standards to individual cases. 36 Because
a jury uniquely represents the "average person," some have
recommended its use in any obscenity litigation,3 7 especially where
a determination in a civil case could be used in a subsequent criminal ation.3s While at least one state court has required the use of

33. See infra text accompanying notes 54-124. In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49 (1973), the Court rejected a defense claim that a theater patronized by consenting
adults was protected from regulation by the right to privacy recognized in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969). The narrow recognition of privacy in the home did not extend to a
place of public accommodation such as a theater, and thus state controls did not exceed
constitutionally exercised police power. Id at 66-67. In addition, state interests in protecting
the quality of community life outweighed the privacy argument. Id. at 58. See BARRON &
DIENES, supra note 21, § 10:5.
34. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592,604 (1975). The Court held that because of the
close similarity between nuisance actions and criminal prosecutions, the doctrine of
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), applies to the former as well as the latter.
35. See McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 687-88 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
36. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). See also Justice Tobriner's dissent in
Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 17 Cal. 3d 42, 550 P.2d 600, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, cert.
denied sub nom. Van de Kamp v. Projection Room Theater, 429 U.S. 922 (1976), in which he
stated that the Miller test could be consistently applied only with use of a jury. "If this
constitutional 'test' can be consistently applied at all, and I have already expressed my
serious doubts that it can, it seems clear that a jury, as a microcosm of the community, is the
only 'trier of fact' fit to conduct the inquiry contemplated by Miller." Id. at 73, 550 P. 2d at
619, 130 Cal. Rptr at 347.
37. See McKinney, 424 U.S. at 687-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
38. One commentary suggests that if a jury trial is available for a contempt citation, the
remedy of an injunction would not be very effective because a defendant could violate it and
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an advisory jury on the issue of obscenity, 39 the Supreme Court
has held, in construing another state's former nuisance law, that
40
trial by jury was not constitutionally required.
The second procedural benefit derived from the prosecutor's choice
of a civil over a criminal action is a lower standard of necessary
proof. Although the burden of proving obscenity remains with the
government censor, 4 1 the Court has recently held that in a civil
action for abatement of an obscenity nuisance proof beyond a
reasonable doubt is not constitutionally mandated. 42 A state may
itself offer defendants in civil suits such protection but, as the
Court indicated, the first and fourteenth amendments do not com43
pel it to do so.
Use of civil actions, despite their attractive procedural aspects,
have raised issues of substantive unconstitutionality. In most
cases, these questions have been resolved in the prosecution's

favor.
Substantive ConstitutionalProblems Raised by Civil Actions
Several states have relied on their general nuisance statutes in
bringing civil obscenity suits. Based on common law principles,
nuisance laws were originally enacted to abate such annoyances
as offensive odors, noises or soot and smoke. 44 Public nuisance
laws are generally enforced by the state and govern any interference with the common rights of the public, rather than individual

always relitigate the issue of obscenity. See Note, Obscenity as a Public Nuisance, supra
note 18, at 402.
39. McNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1975). If a jury finds that the material is not
obscene, that determination is binding. If the jury finds the material to be obscene, the court
must make an independent judgment. Comment, The Devil and the D.A., supra note 7, at
1339.
40. Alexander v. Virginia, 413 U.S. 836 (1973).
41. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
42. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.' Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90 (1981). An issue that
remains unanswered by Cooper is the extent to which a criminal burden of proof of obscenity would be required in a criminal contempt action against a distributor for violation of a
nuisance injunction. An argument might be made that in order to enforce an injunction
with criminal sanctions, the issue of the obscenity of the materials might have to be relitigated and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
43. Id. at 174. Justice Stevens in dissent stated that the Court should not have decided
this case because the state court did not indicate that its decision was based on federal as
opposed to state law. If based on state law, the Supreme Court would have no jurisdiction in
the matter. Id. at 175-76. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
44. "Public nuisance laws generally cover acts which affect the safety, health, morals,
comfort and convenience of the general public. They cover everything from maintenance of
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rights.45 Originally, they were punished as common law crimes.4 6
The law of nuisance has been described as an "impenetrable
jungle," surrounded by vagueness, uncertainty, and confusion. 47
This is due in large measure to its development through the common law, where it was imprecisely and indiscriminately applied. 48
It is hardly surprising that the application of nuisance laws to first
amendment issues, where delicate and precise delineations are
necessary,49 raises serious questions of constitutionality. 50 State
courts confronting this problem have found it necessary to apply a
significant judicial gloss to otherwise imprecise nuisance actions if
their use in obscenity regulation is to be upheld.5 1
Such judicial construction has been accomplished by reliance on
constitutional preferences in favor of a statute's constitutionality
and by incorporating into state law the standards set by the
2 The Miller
Supreme Court in Miller v. California.5
standards outline for the trier of fact three basic guidelines for determining
whether a work is obscene: first, whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards would find that the
work, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interests; second,
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable state law; and
finally, whether the work taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value. 53
Typical of cases employing a constructional preference in favor
of public nuisance laws is Busch v. ProjectionRoom Theater,5 4 in

noxious odors to operation of bawdy houses." BARRON & DIENES, supra note 21, at 693.
45.

46.
47.

W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 605 (1971)

Id. at 607.
There is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle in the entire law than that which
surrounds the word 'nuisance.' It has meant all things to all men and has been
applied indiscriminately to everything from an alarming advertisement to a cockroach baked in a pie. There is generally agreement that it is incapable of any
exact or comprehensive definition. (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 592.
48. Id.
49. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
50. See Rendleman, supra note 17, at 522.
51. See, e.g., Busch v. Projection Room Theater, 17 Cal. 3d 42,550 P.2d 600, 130 Cal. Rptr.
328, cert. denied sub nom. Van de Kamp v. Projection Room Theater, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
"[Slome courts have followed what can only be described as a tortuous route to find that
even general public nuisance or redlight statutes also incorporate the applicable constitutional standards." Rendleman, supra note 17, at 526.
52. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
53. Id. at 24.
54. 17 Cal. 3d 42,550 P.2d 600, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, cert. denied sub nom. Van de Kamp v.
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which the California Supreme Court upheld application of the
state's nuisance statute to theaters and bookstores distributing
obscene material. The nuisance law provided for abatement of
anything "injurious to health, . .. indecent, or offensive to the
senses ... so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life
or property by an entire community. 5 5 The defendants chal56
lenged such language as being impermissibly vague.
In analyzing the statute, the court found that the proscribed acts
were those injurious to health or, alternatively, indecent or offensive to the senses, and that obscenity could qualify as a nuisance
under the latter categories as well as under the former.5 7 The court,
relying on its obligation to construe statutes so as to uphold their
validity,5 8 held that the standards enunciated in Miller u.California, as incorporated in California's criminal obscenity statute,
were likewise a component of the nuisance law, thus saving it from
59
vagueness challenges.
In addition to vagueness, public nuisance laws may also be
attacked as facially overbroad, especially when applied to exhibitions of sexual materials. For this reason, courts must construe the
statutes narrowly to uphold their constitutionality.6 0 The Supreme
Court of Kansas, for example, in State v. Motion Picture Entitled
"The Bet,"61 construed the word "obscene" in its public nuisance
statute to mean only that material which comports with Miller
standards. 6 2 The court justified this construction by referring to its

Projection Room Theater, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
55. Id. at 49, 550 P.2d at 603, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
56. The Court specifically rejected the application of the California "Red Light Abatement" law to situations involving expression. Id. at 60-61, 550 P.2d at 611, 130 Cal. Rptr. at
339.
57. Id. at 50-51, 550 P.2d at 604-05, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 332-33.
58. Id. at 56, 550 P.2d at 608,130 Cal. Rptr. at 336 (citing the Supreme Court's directive in
United States v. 12 200-Foot-Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973)).
59. Id. Justice Tobriner in dissent stated that the vice of vagueness is not cured because
the determination of obscenity rests on "subjective preference or a conjecture about the
tastes and fancy of one's neighbors." Id. at 72, 550 P.2d at 619, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 347. One
commentary describes the results as "a little bizarre. ..'[L]ewd' in the redlight act may not
be used for obscenity but may be used against live entertainment; 'indecent or offensive to
the senses' may be used against obscenity primarily because it had been previously used
against live entertainment." Rendleman, supra note 17, at 526.
Remedial construction such as that used by the California court has met with Supreme
Court approval in the context of criminal obscenity cases. See Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767,
774-75 (1977), where the Court held that the Illinois obscenity statute which had been
construed to incorporate the Miller guidelines was not overbroad.
60. Rendleman, supra note 17, at 524-25.
61. 219 Kan. 64, 547 P.2d 760 (1976).
62. Id. at 70-71, 547 P.2d at 767. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.. 427 U.S. 50
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past difficulties in regulating obscenity 63 and its compliance with
the obvious intent of the legislature in declaring such exhibitions a
nuisance. 64 As further support, the court cited opinions from nine
other jurisdictions which applied a similar construction to uphold
otherwise overly broad obscenity laws. 65 However, the first amendment prohibits statutory restrictions which might restrain protected as well as unprotected material,6 6 and in such cases not
even a narrowing construction will remedy the unconstitutional
67
defect.
The use of public nuisance statutes in obscenity control has also
raised questions concerning the constitutional right to privacy.
Because a public nuisance must somehow interfere with the common rights of the public, an issue arises as to the application of
such laws to the regulation of private exhibitions to consenting
and paying adults.6 Justice Tobriner in his dissent in Busch
argued that because California's nuisance law required interference with public sensory perceptions, and not just sensibilities,
private showings did not qualify as public nuisances. 69 Additionally, because the California law required interference with the
comfortable enjoyment of life, those not entering the theaters or
stores in question could not be affected and thus their enjoyment of
70
life was not harmed.

(1976), suggests that compliance with Miller guidelines may not be required for all types of
regulations. But see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
In New York v. Ferber, 102 S. Ct. 3348 (1982), the Court emphasized its inclination to take
into consideration the content of material involved when faced with laws suppressing such
material despite its failure to meet traditional obscenity standards. In this case, the Court
enunciated a separate test for visual or photographic depiction of sexual display or conduct
involving children. Id. at 3354-58.
63. 219 Kan. at 67-68,547 P.2d at 765. The court placed part of the blame for its difficulty
on vacillation by the Supreme Court.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 70-71, 547 P.2d at 767 and cases cited therein. But see City of Chicago v.
Festival Theater Corp., 88 Ill. App. 3d 216,410 N.E.2d 341 (1981), where the court refused to
incorporate Miller standards in a nuisance action against live performances.
66. See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
67. For example, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), the Supreme
Court held that a nuisance law forbidding the display of films containing nudity on drive-in
movie screens was impermissibly broad even if its purpose was the protection of youth. Id.
at 213. Because the legislation could not be subjected to a narrowing construction, it was
unconstitutional. Id. at 216.
68. Comment, The Devil and the D.A., supra note 7, at 1333.
69. Busch, 17 Cal. 3d at 65, 550 P.2d at 614, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
70. Id. at 66, 550 P.2d at 615, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 342.
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The Busch majority rejected this construction and similar contentions based on a right to privacy and held instead that a state
may constitutionally conclude that obscenity injures the community. 71 The court stated that merely because a film is exposed only
to the paying, consenting public does not transform it into an
exhibition not interfering with community interests.7 2 Courts other
than Busch have reached similar conclusions in rejecting a pri73
vacy challenge to obscenity regulation.
While the foregoing issues of statutory construction have provoked much discussion by the courts considering constitutional
challenges to nuisance statutes, for the most part their resolution
has favored the prosecution and has not significantly damaged
the utility of such laws in obscenity regulation. Challenges predicated on the doctrine against unlawful prior restraint, however,
have stymied the courts' application of nuisance laws to obscenity
cases. This, in turn, has generally had a devastating effect on the
remedial aspects of nuisance laws and has rendered them virtually
worthless when directed toward forms of expression.
ProceduralRequirements Imposed to Avoid Unlawful PriorRestraint
One of the more attractive aspects of the civil regulation of
expression is the availability of broad remedies which might operate to halt the distribution of obscenity. A civil injunction prohibiting any future display of offensive materials or an order closing an
objectionable business would certainly be an effective weapon for
the government to wield against obscenity. The doctrine of prior
restraint, however, severely curtails the use of such a weapon.
Prior restraint has been defined as the governmental use of a censorship system, court injunction, or other means to prohibit or
restrict expression in advance of publication, even though such
74
expression may be suppressed lawfully after publication.
7
5
In the landmark case of Near v. Minnesota, the Supreme

71. Id. at 52-53, 550 P.2d at 606, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 334. The court relied on Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 66-67 (1973).
72. 17 Cal. 3d at 52-53, 550 P.2d at 606, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 334.
73. Id. at 51, 550 P.2d at 605, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 333. See, e.g., State ex rel. Ewing v.
"Without a Stitch," 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 102-03, 307 N.E.2d 911,916 (1974), appeal dismissed
sub nom. Art Theater Guild, Inc. v. Ewing, 421 U.S. 923 (1975).
74. Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REv. 422,
454 (1980).

75.

283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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Court applied the doctrine of prior restraint to a statute allowing
an injunction against publication of a newspaper that contained
allegedly libelous material. 76 The Court held that but for a few
narrow exceptions restrictions on expression prior to publication
were unlawful; obscenity constituted one such exception.7 7 Subsequent cases have held that prior to an adjudication as to the character of the material, it is deemed protected by the first amendment
and cannot be suppressed. 78 In Freedman v. Maryland79 and South8 0 the Court outlined specific
eastern Promotions, Ltd. u. Conrad,
procedural steps which must be taken before suppression may
occur. Although decided in the context of administrative censorship, these standards apply to adjudicatory proceedings as well
and impose on civil actions safeguards similar to those required in
a criminal case."'
8 2 an exhibitor was convicted for
In Freedman v. Maryland,
showing a film before he submitted it to the Maryland State Board
of Censors for approval.8 3 Although the Court did not find prior
restraint unconstitutional per se,8 4 it found serious flaws in the
Maryland procedure which did not provide for a judicial hearing
before censorship nor give any assurance of prompt judicial
review.8 5 The Court reversed the conviction and enunciated several procedural safeguards, which, if adhered to, would avoid a
finding of unconstitutionality. After placing the burden of proving
obscenity on the attempted censor,8 6 the Court held that only a
judicial determination of obscenity would support a final decision
to ban distribution.8 7 In view of this requirement, any restraint
ordered by an administrative agency must be limited to the shortest possible time before a final judicial decision can be ren-

76. Id. at 702.
77. Id. at 716. Professor Emerson speculates that the ad hoc balancing engaged in by the
Burger Court has weakened the prior restraint doctrine by depriving the exceptions of their
categorial nature. Emerson, supra note 74, at 455.
78. See, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
79. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
80. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
81.

See Note, Vance u. Universal Amusement Co., Inc., 8 AM J. CRIM. L. 199 (1980)

[hereinafter cited as Note, Vance].
82. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
83. Id. at 52-53.
84. Id. at 53.
85. Id. at 55.
86. Id. at 58.
87. Id.

19821

Obscenity Control

dered.88 A prompt final determination is required, the Court stated,
to prevent a chilling effect on otherwise protected expression. 89
Because the Maryland procedure lacked such safeguards, it was
deemed an invalid prior restraint. 90 In concluding, the Court
stressed the necessity of relieving the exhibitor from the undue
burden and consequent chill of having to institute judicial proceedings to secure his right to expression. 91
The Court reaffirmed its Freedman guidelines ten years later in
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad.92 The petitioner, a promoter for the musical road company production of "Hair," brought
suit to force Chattanooga, Tennessee officials to allow performances in the municipal auditorium after an administrative board
had denied its request. 93 After examining the procedure followed
by the city board, the Court concluded that the denial amounted to
a prior restraint because the city required the promoter to apply for
permission to use the theater and the board had full discretionary
authority to grant or deny permission depending on the content of
the performance. 94 Moreover, none of the limited exceptions to the
prior restraint doctrine were applicable 95 and the nature of the
board's restraint was permanent and final. 96 In striking the denial
of a permit, the Court reiterated the rule of Freedman that the
burden of instituting actions belongs with the censor, and that any
be brief and final judicial
temporary restraint of expression must
97
determinations of obscenity prompt.
Courts applying the requirements of Freedman and Southeastern Promotions have prohibited restraint of expression prior to an
adjudicatory hearing on the question of obscenity, thereby limiting
the sanctions of nuisance injunctions to material previously judged
obscene. 98 The Supreme Court has approved the use of civil regulations only where the authorities involved made no attempt to

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 59.
Id.
Id. at 60.
Id. at 59.
420 U.S. 546 (1975).
Id. at 549.
Id. at 554.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 557.
Id. at 562.
See Edelstein & Mott, Collateral Problems in Obscenity Regulation: A Uniform

Approach to Prior Restraints, Community Standards, and Judgment Preclusion, 7 SETON

HALL 543, 565 (1976).
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censor before a judicial determination of obscenity. 99 Broad injunctions and closure orders which operate irrespective of a prior hearing have been uniformly rejected even in cases where the nuisance
statutes themselves were upheld. 10 0
For example, the nuisance law at issue in Busch v.Projection
Room Theater 0 1 did not specifically provide for an adversary
hearing on obscenity as Freedman required. 10 2 The defendants
claimed that this deficiency was fatal and argued that the court
should not "read into" the statute a provision not included originally. 10 3 Engaging in some "judicial redrafting" and noting its
power to construe laws in order to avoid constitutional infirmities,
the Busch majority judicially required an adversary hearing prior
10 4
to governmental restraint.
In addition to the questionable constitutionality of the lack of an
obscenity hearing, the possible sweeping scope of a remedial
injunction raised severe constitutional problems. The California
court authored two opinions in Busch. The original opinion held
that an injunction need not be limited to materials already adjudicated as obscene. This holding would have given trial courts the
power to grant closure orders that operated as final restraints of
any exhibition on the premises. 10 5 By withdrawing its first opinion and issuing a second which greatly limited the scope of any
permissible injunction, 0 6 the court imposed upon law enforcement
officials the task of litigating the obscenity of each particular book
or film in question. The second Busch opinion, recognizing that
closure orders were beyond the power of the judiciary,10 7 concluded
99. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
100. See Edelstein & Mott, supra note 98, at 565.
101. 17 Cal. 3d 42,550 P.2d 600, 130 Cal. Rptr. 328, cert.denied sub nom. Van de Kamp v.
Projection Room Theater, 429 U.S. 722 (1976).
102. Id. at 59,550 P.2d at 610, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 338.

103. Id.
104. Id. at 60, 550 P.2d at 611, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 339. In his dissent, Justice Tobriner
makes the following observation:
The majority justifies this judicial rewriting of the statute by referring to the
principle that laws should be construed so as to uphold their validity. There is,
however, an alternative way to construe the statutes involved in this case so as to
render them immune to constitutional attack: They can be interpreted as inapplicable to private behavior. Given that the applicability of the statute's language to
private behavior is, at best, highly dubious, this reading would seem the more
judicious way to construe the statute so as to uphold its validity.
Id. at 74 n.7, 550 P.2d at 620 n.7, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 348 n.7.
105. Note, Obscenity as a Public Nuisance in California,supra note 18, at 395.
106. Id. at 396.
107. Busch, 17 Cal. 3d at 59,550 P.2d at 610, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 338. The court stated: "We
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that abatement must be directed at particular obscene material
8
and not at the premises where such material is exhibited.10
In State ex rel. Ewing v. "Without a Stitch,"'0 9 the Ohio Supreme
Court construed the state nuisance statute to allow a temporary
injunction only after a hearing at which both parties could offer
evidence on the issue of obscenity. 110 The court also judicially
imposed a requirement of scienter on the part of a theater owner
before the nuisance sanctions could be levied against him."' The
court reviewed the statutory remedies considered mandatory upon
the trial court's finding of nuisance" 2 and noted that its decision
would possibly compel a one year closure order. 1' 3 Recognizing
this as an improper prior restraint, the court construed the remedy
provisions narrowly, stating that the restriction could be lifted
upon the property owner's guarantee that the obscene film in issue
would not be shown. 4 The release provision included a bond
requirement for the entire value of the property, 15 and a penalty
requiring forfeiture of box office receipts from the exhibition of a
film after it had been judged obscene." 6
In contrast to Ohio and California, the Supreme Court of Louisiana decided that its nuisance law as applied to obscenity was

are aware of no reported cases authorizing the closing of a bookstore or theatre, even after it
has been repeatedly determined judicially in a full adversary hearing that all or substantially all of the magazines or films exhibited or sold therein are obscene." Id.
108. Although Justice Clark indicated that the Supreme Court had not yet ruled out the
possibility of a total closure, 17 Cal. 3d at 62, P.2d at 612, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 340, that issue has
been effectively foreclosed by the Court's opinions in Vance v. Universal Amusement Co.,
Inc., 445 U.S. 308 (1980), and Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, 454 U.S. 1022 (1981). See infra
text accompanying notes 134-65.
109. 37 Ohio St. 2d 95, 307 N.E.2d 911 (1974).
110. Id. at 99,307 N.E.2d at 914.
111. Id. at 101, 307 N.E.2d at 915 (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1957), as
requiring this result).
112. Id. at 103, 307 N.E.2d at 917.
113. Id. at 104-05, 307 N.E.2d at 917.
114. Id. at 105, 307 N.E.2d at 918. The court recognized its inability to order an injunction against any obscene film as this would be an impermissible prior restraint.
115. Id. At least one other court has held this to be too harsh a restriction on first
amendment rights. See Gulf States Theatres of La., Inc. v. Richardson, 287 So. 2d 480 (La.
1973). See infra text accompanying notes 125-27.
116. 37 Ohio St. 2d at 105, 307 N.E.2d at 918. Because the enjoined nuisance is only the
particular film in question, bond forfeiture would not occur upon the showing of any other
films, but a bond requirement might have the effect of placing an economic burden on the
theater owner and thus cause him to engage in self censorship in the future. One court has
stated that such a requirement deprives the owner of his property without due process of
law. Gulf States Theatres of La., Inc. v. Richardson, 287 So. 2d 480, 492 (La. 1973). Nevertheless, the Ewing court did not address this problem.
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irredeemably unconstitutional when tested against Freedman
standards. 17 Suit was originally brought by theater owners to
enjoin local officials from interfering with the exhibition of the
film "Last Tango in Paris." ' s In response, the officials sought an
injunction against exhibition of the film under the state nuisance
abatement law. 119 That law provided for an ex parte temporary
injunction which the trial court was required to issue upon a
statement from the district attorney, on his information or belief,
that the challenged material was obscene; 120 no judicial determination of obscenity was required.' 2' The court found the provision
for an ex parte injunction unconstitutional on its face and, therefore, unenforceable. 22 In addition, the court found that the remaining provisions constituted an illegal prior restraint because they
lacked those Freedman safeguards which allowed restraint only
after an adversary hearing and an assurance of a prompt judicial
determination of obscenity. 123 In its analysis of the closure power
provided in the statute, the court pointed out that when, as in this
case, a law designed to control gambling and prostitution was
amended to regulate obscenity first amendment problems intensified. Thus, the antiquated and minimum safeguards incorporated
originally were insufficient to sustain the constitutionality of clo124
sure orders in the area of expression.
Like the Ohio statute in Ewing,' 25 the Louisiana statute provided
that a property owner, with or without knowledge of objectionable
material on the premises, could apply for release of his property if

117.
118.

Gulf States Theatres, 287 So. 2d at 492.
Id. at 483.

119.

Id.

120. Id. at 485.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 487.
123. Id. at 489.
124. The Gulf States Theatres court stated:
This particular constitutional defect [padlocking] ... probably results from the
fact that the two situations [prostitution and gambling versus obscenity] were
analogized. [The nuisance law] originally abated the particular public nuisance of
houses of prostitution. The amendment.., in 1960 to include obscenity, an exception to the First Amendment right, simply treated obscenity as a nuisance.
Defendants... use a 1918 procedure providing only the minimal safeguards for
abatement of houses of prostitution to close a First Amendment protected tool of
communication, a motion picture theatre.
287 S6 2d at 491 n.2. See also Universal Amusement Co., Inc. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159, 165
(5th Cir. 1978).
125. 37 Ohio St. 2d at 105, 307 N.E.2d at 918.
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he posted a bond for its full value.126 Unlike the Ewing court, however, the Louisiana court ruled this a deprivation of due process
because rendering full value was as much a restraint as the state's
retention of the property itself.1 27 Also unacceptable was the provision that proof of a nuisance would be based on the general
reputation of the premises involved.1 28 The court asserted that one
could not be found guilty of a new infraction solely on the basis of
29
past exhibitions of obscene material.
State courts, in recognition of Freedman, have acknowledged
their inability to restrain sexually expressive materials prior to a
hearing on obscenity. The result has been that broad injunctions
providing for closure orders have been denied even when the nuisance law itself has been upheld. The Supreme Court in two recent
decisions has further clarified the doctrine applied by the states.
Supreme Court Reaction to Civil Regulation
The foregoing discussion illustrates that judicial efforts to deal
with the problem of obscenity regulation from a civil perspective
have raised a number of substantive and procedural problems. In
addition, the lack of cultural consensus regarding obscenity reflects
1 30
the consequent inappropriateness of harsh criminal remedies.
Thus, critics have advocated the abolition of all criminal regulation in favor of a totally civil scheme. Their approach calls for civil
regulation as a temporary compromise during the period of time
that society's attitudes are shifting away from censorship of sex31
ual material.
What appears to be happening, however, is a growing shift both
by courts and law enforcement agencies favoring the use of crimi126. 287 So. 2d at 492.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 492-93.
129. Id. at 493.
130. Rendleman, supra note 17, at 509.
The criminal approach to the control of obscenity seems more repressive and
anachronistic every day. Perhaps the major problem is that obscenity doctrine is
simply too arcane and unpredictable to support criminal sanctions. As Justice
Douglas has asserted, "to send men to jail for violating standards they cannot
understand, construe and apply is a monstrous thing to do in a Nation dedicated
to fair trials and due process."
Id. at 513.
131. Id. at 510. While advocating a civil approach, the author cautions against retaining
a dual system of control citing the potential danger of prosecutorial harassment and the
resulting chill of distributors' first amendment rights. Id. at 514-21. See also BARRON &
DIENES, supra note 21, at 676 (1979).
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nal sanctions. 3 2 Although civil actions are being instituted, the
recent Supreme Court trend to limit the remedies available under
nuisance abatement statutes has rendered them generally in33
effective.
Vance v. Universal Amusement Co.
In Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., Inc., 3 4 the Supreme
Court affirmed by per curiam opinion the decision of the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals invalidating a Texas civil nuisance statute as applied to obscenity. 135 Because the Supreme Court opinion
is quite brief, the Fifth Circuit's decision is significant. In that
opinion, the court directed its attention to the following three
issues: (1) whether the provisions of the Texas statute providing for
closure of the premises for one year could be constitutionally applied in an obscenity context; (2) whether the state could fashion
an injunction against unnamed films not directly before the court;
and (3) whether the statute provided procedural safeguards required by constitutional law. With regard to the first issue, the
court, in order to save the statute, held that the state's closure
power was limited to other activities listed in the legislative
scheme, namely, gambling, prostitution, and liquor violations and
that the state was limited solely to an injunctive remedy only in
those areas touched by the first amendment. 136 A broader reading
of the remedy available for abatement of obscenity, according to
13 7
the court, would render the law an unconstitutional prior restraint.
The second issue considered by the court of appeals was the
state's ability to enjoin the showing of unnamed films not directly
before the trial court by merely prohibiting exhibition of specific
acts listed in the Texas obscenity statute. 3 8 In this way an injunction could be enforced against future films without a specific
determination as to the obscenity of each. The court held that such
139
a broad ban could not withstand a claim of invalid prior restraint.

132. See infra text accompanying notes 165-70.
133. See infra text accompanying notes 165-67.
134. 445 U.S. 308 (1980).
135. Universal Amusement Co., Inc. v. Vance, 587 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1978).
136. Id. at 166.
137. Id. at 166 n.13 (citing twelve other decisions in accord). The Supreme Court accepted
this statutory construction and declined an opportunity to consider its merits. Vance, 445
U.S. at 315 n.1 I.Given the trend of its previous decisions, however, there is no indication
that the Court would sanction a closure remedy. But see discussion infra note 162.
138. 587 F.2d at 167-68.
139. Id. at 169.
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The third and interrelated issue before the Fifth Circuit was the
alleged failure of the statute to provide sufficient procedural safeguards required by constitutional law. 140 The Texas procedure, it
was argued, failed to treat obscenity nuisance actions with the
special sensitivity required in a first amendment context.141 Under
Texas law it was possible for a trial court to issue an ex parte
restraining order and a temporary injunction based only on the
state's showing of "probable right" (or probable eventual success). 42
On appeal of such an order, the exhibitor had no opportunity to
argue nonobscenity;143 only at a full trial on the merits could the
character of the material be litigated.1 44 The Fifth Circuit held this
scheme deficient under Freedmanstandards. 145
The Supreme Court accepted the appellate court's procedural
construction of the Texas law 146 and only cursorily examined the
statute involved. Review was limited to two specific issues: first,
whether the practical operation of an obscenity nuisance injunction produced no greater prior restraint than did a criminal law,
and second, whether the court of appeals had ruled that prior re47
straint of expression was never available.1
In addressing the appellant's claim of comparability to criminal
law, the Court reviewed the procedural aspects of the Texas civil
nuisance statute. 48 Texas procedure allowed unlimited injunctions against exhibitors of films that were not yet finally judged
obscene. 49 Violation of an injunction posed the threat of criminal
sanctions for the violator, regardless of whether the films were
ultimately declared not obscene after full review of the merits.150
Because of this result, the Supreme Court found the civil nuisance
statute more objectionable than the criminal law which sanctioned
violators only after an adjudication of obscenity.' 5'
The Court dismissed the second issue raised by the appellants in
one short paragraph. According to the state, the Fifth Circuit had

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 170.
Id.
Id. at 171.
Id. at 172.
445 U.S. at 316 n.14.
Id. at 314-15.
Id. at 315-17.
Id. at 316.
Id.
Id.
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incorrectly ruled that no prior restraint of expression was ever
available. The Supreme Court refused to accept this characterization of the appellate court's holding, stating only that the decision

merely found the particular statutes under review constitutionally
152

deficient.
At first blush, Vance does not appear to add significantly to the
issue of the use of civil proceedings to restrain obscenity. However,
by reaffirming the necessity of a prior determination of obscenity
before suppressing each film or publication, the Supreme Court
has imposed on the states the burden of litigating the merits of a
voluminous amount of material, without a remedy which might
make such litigation worthwhile. Indeed, one comment concludes
that Vance's requirement of Freedman-like safeguards indicates
that "the Court wants to restrict the states' enforcement of obscenity cases to the criminal system or at least to a system which
153
requires the same essential safeguards as the criminal process."
Since the Vance opinion lacks detail and discussion, it is unclear
whether the Court actually intended this result. Nonetheless, the
practical effect of placing Vance's limitations upon the government is that civil litigation is encumbered severely.
The Court has previously approved civil sanctions where the
government censor did not attempt to restrain expression before
an adjudication of obscenity. 154 That the Court now may, in fact,
prefer the use of criminal procedures when restraint is contemplated may be implied from its statement that prior civil restraints
carry a heavier presumption against constitutionality than do post
hoc criminal sanctions: "[b]ehind the distinction is a theory deeply
etched in our law: a free society prefers to punish the few who
abuse the rights of speech after they break the law than to throttle
55
them and all others beforehand."
One commentator has suggested that Vance turned upon a lack
of procedural safeguards and not upon restraint itself and that by
requiring procedures similar to those in the criminal system, the
Court meant to compel states to abandon civil proceedings in favor
of criminal actions. 156 While this analysis may go too far in discerning the Court's deliberate preference, the Vance opinion cer-

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Id. at 317.
Note, Vance, supra note 81, at 206.
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
Vance, 445 U.S. at 316 n.1 3 . See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
Note, Vance, supra note 81, at 207.
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tainly does not offer states much hope of designing a civil obscenity scheme which would reach any farther than particularly
adjudicated material. 157 State attempts to use nuisance laws as a
broad and sweeping remedy have thus been curtailed by Vance.
The Supreme Court has subsequently confirmed this position.
Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc.
In Spokane Arcades, Inc. v. Brockett,158 the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals upheld certain provisions of a Washington moral nuisance law which authorized the issuance of a temporary restraining order prohibiting owners from removing from their property
allegedly obscene material, but not prohibiting its sale or exhibition.1 59 The remainder of the law, however, was ruled invalid. Relying on Vance, Freedman and Southeastern Promotions,the court
held that the statute did not provide the necessary constitutional
safeguards for issuance of an abatement injunction. 160 Its deficiencies included authorization for a judge to grant discretionary
temporary orders without assurance of a prompt judicial determination of obscenity, the possibility that an injunction could issue
which would prevent future exhibitions or sales of unreviewed

157. Even prior to the Vance opinion, Texas officials recognized the problem inherent in
its nuisance law. The transcript of the oral argument as quoted by Chief Justice Burger in
his dissent includes the following exchange:
QUESTION: Well, what does it-why, then, do you need (this statute), if it is the
equivalent of the Texas criminal law?
MR. ZWEINER: I am not sure that we do, to be frank; butQUESTION: What does it add to the criminal law. It changes the burden of proof,
it deprives a person of a jury trial.
MR. ZWEINER: I don't think it adds anything. As a matter of fact, I think it is a
cumbersome process and I don't know that the prosecutor after more than two
rounds will ever use it again.
Vance, 445 U.S. at 318 n.1 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The state's lack of enthusiasm toward
its own law is demonstrated by its nine-page brief which defended the statute in a "perfunctory fashion," "out of a sense of duty." Id. at 318-19 n.2.
158. 631 F.2d 135 (9th Cir. 1980).
159. Id. at 137-38. See United States v. Little Beaver Theatre, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 120 (S.D.
Fla. 1971).
The Little Beaverinjunction accommodates several interests: the state receives an
order backed by the court's contempt power which preserves the evidence; the
defendant is permitted to continue his business; and the court is able to adjudicate
the obscenity of a film that might otherwise end up in Mexico or the projectionist's
wastebasket. Ex parte preservation orders are constitutional, for they neither
restrain expression prior to publication nor deter future expression. (footnote
omitted).
Rendleman, supra note 17, at 540.
160. 631 F.2d at 138.
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material, and relief provisions which resulted in an impermissible
shift of the burden of proof to the owner or operator. 161 In addition,
the court deemed Washington's closure order remedy an impermissible prior restraint, while acknowledging that a closure order
16 2
which conformed to first amendment standards might be upheld.
16 3
Although affirmed without opinion by the Supreme Court,
Brockett is further evidence of the Court's commitment to requiring strict procedural standards in the civil regulation of obscenity.
Lower court decisions have generally interpreted the Court's directives as broadly prohibiting any restraint of unadjudicated material and as requiring the rejection of civil schemes which fail to
provide adequate safeguards before sanctions are imposed. 6 4 In
sum, the Court's message to the states appears to be that, although
civil nuisance actions will be allowed, the proceedings must conform in all respects to guidelines which not only complicate the
litigation but which reduce the effectiveness of the statutes' ultimate remedies.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 139. In light of the development of the law in this area, it is difficult to
conceive of a closure power which would meet these requirements. But see Avenue Book
Store v. City of Tallmadge, Ohio, 103 S. Ct. 356 (1982), where the Supreme Court denied
certiorari in a case involving the issuance of a permanent closure order directed to the rear
portion of a bookstore held to be a common law public nuisance. The court of appeals
decision left intact by the denial held that because no punishment could be imposed until
after a contempt hearing, which includes a determination of the obscenity issue, the restraint was not unlawful in practice. It did not "carry with it any of the dangers of a
censorship system" because the purveyor was not barred from selling protected material
and no final restraint or punishment was possible until after a hearing on a contempt
charge. Id. at 357 (White, J., dissenting) (citing App. to Pet. for Cert. at 48-49).
Justice White in dissent stated that the application of nuisance laws to obscenity regulation and the necessary attendant procedural safeguards raised unsettled constitutional
questions. Id. at 357. The consequent chilling effect of such a closure order which is not
directed to specifically adjudicated material seems self-evident. See Freedman v. Maryland,
380 U.S. 51 (1965).
163. 454 U.S. 1022 (1981). Justices Burger, Powell and Rehnquist filed strenuous dissents
in Brockett. They argued that because the law had been recently enacted and never applied
or construed by state courts, principles of comity and federalism prevented federal court
interference. Id. at 1023.
164. Vance has been cited as authority by the Seventh Circuit which, in two separate
cases involving business licensing statutes, ruled that a license denial could not be based
upon prior arrests under the obscenity laws, Chulchian v. Indianapolis, 633 F.2d 27 (7th Cir.
1980), and that a procedure authorizing license revocation of a theater based on an administrative determination of the obscenity of prior films was invalid. Entertainment Concepts,
Inc. III v. Maciejewski, 631 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 919 (1981). See also
Yuclan Enterprises v. Arre, 488 F. Supp. 820 (D. Hawaii 1980); Cornflower Entertainment
Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 485 F. Supp. 777 (D. Utah 1980); but see Chateau X, Inc. v.
Andrews, 275 S.E.2d 443 (N.C. 1981), where the court aplied a much narrower reading of
Vance based on the distinction between the severity of criminal and civil remedies.
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PracticalApplications

When viewed from the perspective of law enforcement officers
attempting to deal effectively with the ever increasing supply of
sexually explicit periodicals and films, a civil nuisance action
simply is not very satisfactory. First, effective enforcement of a
nuisance injunction involves two separate hearings: the original
hearing at which an order is rendered, and a criminal contempt
action if the injunction is violated. The possibility of criminal
sanctions raises issues regarding the necessity of a jury trial and
the appropriate burden of proof. First amendment standards may
even mandate a relitigation of the obscenity issue or at least the
introduction of evidence on changes in community standards from
165
the time the injunction was issued.
In addition, civil nuisance enforcement is a costly and time consuming process and while litigation progresses, distributors can
continue to reap huge profits from the exhibition of obscene materials. 166 Moreover, should the state succeed in suppressing one
film or publication, the victory is hollow because most of the material in question is so similar and is produced on such a mass scale
that there already exists a replacement for the banned article
which may not be suppressed before the protracted litigation is
repeated.
In contrast to the civil regulatory approach, criminal prosecution can be relatively quick 167 and definite. Although it too reaches
only specifically adjudicated material, a criminal action which
results in imposition of a fine and possible jail sentence eliminates
In another opinion striking a revocation of a business license statute for past violations of
obscenity laws, a Utah district court judge stated his view of the proper means of obscenity
control as reinforced by the decision in Vance:
The struggle against pornography has seen various methods used to try to
eliminate it from the community. Some of these ignore the constitutional dangers
of prior restraint of speech. There are methods, however, that are consistent with
the constitution and that can be effective. The teachings of the Supreme Court
decisions emphasize the desirability of criminal prosecution as a means to control
those who traffic in constitutionally unprotected obscene materials. It is the long
experience of this court that there is nothing more effective in deterring criminal
conduct than certainty of fine and/or imprisonment, according to the severity of
the offense, after an expeditious trial.
Cornflower Entertainment, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 485 F. Supp. 777,787 (D. Utah 1980).
165. See McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 689-90 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
166. See PORNOGRAPHY, supra note 15, at 45.
167. Criminal court dockets usually move more quickly than civil dockets because of the
speedy trial requirements under the sixth amendment It is questionable whether placing
civil nuisance actions on a priority schedule is worth the added burden on the system when

the rewards of injunction include only the restraint of a limited amount of material.
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the need for subsequent litigation. In addition, because an injunction restraining only one item of expression is less harsh a penalty
than a criminal conviction, the latter sanction may produce a
greater deterrent effect and thus be the preferred prosecutorial
remedy.
Apparently recognizing the drawbacks of choosing a civil over a
criminal action, state and local officials seem to rely less and less
on civil obscenity laws. One defense lawyer active in the field has
found, for example, that his clients are no longer seriously threatened by civil injunctions, even though the state in which he practices has a judicially approved nuisance statute related specifically
to obscene films. 1 68 In his opinion, a civil determination of obscenity is still useful in that it informs distributors that the materials
they are contemplating selling are obscene. In a subsequent criminal trial, such a determination could be introduced as evidence of
obscenity, though not conclusive evidence, and thus aid the pro16 9
secutor in meeting his burden of proof.
A civil determination of obscenity would also add a higher
degree of certainty to the operation of a business dealing in marginal "adult" materials. Although this system would serve a salutary purpose, it is not being utilized. The prior restraint problems
associated with any nuisance injunctive action to abate obscenity
force the government to litigate the merits of questionable exhibitions individually. Because of the fungible nature of most of the
sexual material presently available, a distributor can replace
quickly and inexpensively materials judged obscene with nearly
identical items not yet subject to judicial scrutiny. The civil process
must then be reinitiated with little hope of actually controlling
1 70
distribution.

168. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3767.01 (Page 1980).
169. See McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 689-90 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
170. Interview with Bernard A. Berkman, Cleveland, Ohio.
Other prosecutors echo these sentiments. In one local jurisdiction contemplating the use
of civil nuisance proceedings, a county attorney has concluded that such laws are not suited
to the regulation of sexual expression and that any control must remain in the criminal
sector. Interview with county attorney who requested anonymity.
Another community, which had successfully defended an attack on its nuisance ordinance by a local bookstore, settled the case at the appellate level with an agreement not to
enforce the ordinance against the bookselling plaintiffs involved. Although the community
had no immediate plans to invoke the ordinance against these plaintiffs, the government
attorney suggested that under Vance the law which permitted a closure injunction based on
prior criminal obscenity convictions was unconstitutional, and that any subsequent
attempt to enforce it would ultimately prove unsuccessful. In addition, the government
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CONCLUSION

While the Supreme Court endorsement of civil obscenity laws
seemed to promise relief for states trying to cope with the problems
of obscenity regulation, that promise has proved illusory.1 71 The
effect of judicially imposed and constitutionally required standards has left the states with the fruitless task of litigating the
obscenity of each particular film or magazine before sanctions
may be imposed. Although this requirement is present in the criminal system, the remedial aspects of criminal prosecution offer a
more worthwhile result. The social stigma of an arrest, criminal
trial, and possible jail sentence looms as a greater penalty than
does a long and drawn out civil suit which, at worst, would only
restrain the distribution of already outdated materials. The possibility of criminal prosecution might, therefore, cause distributors
who are operating in a marginal area to monitor their stock more
72
closely.1
A nuisance action might be worthwhile when directed toward
full length films which are expensive to produce. These are not as
easily replaced as the average peep-show production and an injunction might deter such films in the future. However, in the typical
case of sexual material distributed on a mass scale, a nuisance
action is simply not cost effective The investment of public funds
in a civil trial, with its attendant hearings and delays, is clearly
not justified by its results: an injunction restraining the usual
individual magazine or film displayed in most adult bookstores.
Perhaps even more telling in weighing the relative merits of civil
and criminal actions are the stricter standard of proof and the
right to a jury trial which inhere in a criminal case. In a society
where the line between obscene and nonobscene material is nebulous, application of these requirements in a civil proceeding to
determine obscenity may better promote first amendment princi-

attorney expressed the opinion that presently structured civil remedies have been rendered
ineffective and the only possibility of their continued use would be if special provisions were
included to allow officials immediate court access to litigate each particular publication
offered for sale by the defendant, without having to initiate new litigation. Interview with
county attorney who requested anonymity.
171. "Since it is evident that any nuisance statute must provide both substantive and
procedural first amendment safeguards in order to withstand constitutional attack, the
public nuisance approach may lose its special appeal to prosecutors as a means of controlling obscenity." Edelstein & Mott, supra note 98, at 563.
172. This is not to imply that the distributor's choice of material should in any constitutional sense be "chilled" by the prospect of criminal charges.
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ples. Perhaps a state should of its own volition comply with the
stricter criminal law standards whenever it seeks to regulate
expression. The Supreme Court has certainly indicated its preference for criminal procedural safeguards in cases of civil obscenity
regulation and this preference should be reflected by discontinuing
the use of antiquated and imprecise nuisance laws in such cases.

